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“What if regions of the World were like the neighbourhoods of a city?...The Arab 
street would be a dark alley where outsiders fear to tread,”1 
(Thomas Friedman) 
 
In this book, Former Wall Street Journal reporter Stephen Glain sets out to answer 
an extremely broad and difficult question: namely why is it that the Arab world, 
specifically the Levantine region, has consistently underperformed economically since 
the beginning of the 20th century. 
The book provides the reader with a somewhat in-depth analysis of the political, 
social and economic state of six Arab nations (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the Palestinian 
territories, Egypt, and Iraq). By breaking down his analysis into country-specific 
chapters, Glain enables the reader to understand the multi-faceted problems facing the 
region as a whole. In doing so, Glain shows the reader a common thread of bad 
governance, corruption, negative external interference, and protectionism; the thread that 
runs through all these nations, causing economic decay. 
Glain uses anecdotal evidence from what is referred to as the “Arab Street” in order 
to paint daily-life pictures of the economic woes that Levantines are faced with. It is easy 
for economic analysts to reflect upon the state of any given economy behind the relative 
safety of an impersonal wall of economic indicators and statistics. That is not to say that 
conducting a purely empirical study of an economy is any way, shape or form less valid 
than a more personable, hands-on approach. However, Stephen Glain adopted the latter in 
his approach to the problem. Having lived in the middle-east for three years as a reporter for 
the Wall Street Journal prior to writing this book, Glain provides an extensive, on-the-
ground economic account gleaned from the direct perspectives of local Arab businessmen, 
workers and journalists. The advantage of adopting such a methodology in forming a study 
is the ability of the author to bridge the gap between economic indicators and their impact 
of the daily lives of people living in those economies.  
Glain is also right to emphasise the fact that Arabs are not by any means inherently 
deficient when it comes to economic matters. In order to punctuate this point, Glain 
riddles his narrative with historical flashbacks of Umayyad and Abbasid successes in 
government and management of their respective economies. From there Glain goes onto 
discussing the economic maladies facing the six aforementioned nations. 
One of the most obvious themes that tie these countries together is the effect of the 
ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the economy of the West Bank itself and the 
neighbouring nations’ economies. 
There are however some glaringly obvious oversights in his analysis. In the Jordanian 
chapter Glain bemoans the inability of the Jordanian government to efficiently and 
competently expedite privatisation. In order to back up his claim Glain cities the Aqaba 
railway corporation and uses this as a reflection of the privatisation process in general. This is 
not an accurate representation, because the Jordanian government has successfully privatised 
44 state-owned industries since 1998 worth a total of 1270 million dollars.2 In attempting to 
 
1Thomas Friedman, The World Is Flat, New York 2005, p. 316. 
2http://www.privatizationlink.com/country/cntrybrowse2.cfm?reg=4&cntry=104 
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draw parallels across international borders Glain has overlooked the progress that various 
governments such as the Jordanian government have achieved in the past 10 years. 
Furthermore, Glain does not fully express the similarities between Iraq, Syria and 
Egypt under nationalist socialist regimes advocating autarky, protectionism and economic 
isolationism. 
Another criticism of the book has to do with Glain’s failure to explain how 
corruption affects the economy. For example Glain does not explain that high levels of 
corruption in the bureaucracy function like a tax. The same argument can be made for the 
presence of a large inefficient bureaucracy. Glain also does not explain how privatisation 
might foster growth and welfare by increasing efficiency and consumer surplus. In 
addition, we also see in the Egypt chapter the presence of capital controls. Glain 
complains about how hard it was for him to exchange 196$ for Egyptian pounds but does 
not tell us about the economic mechanism by which this sort of control can have negative 
effects on the economy in the form of repelling foreign investment, as well as creating a 
distortion in the market which prevents the currency from adjusting to changes in the 
import/export market. 
It is from this perspective that Glain’s title “The Economic Collapse of the Arab 
Economies” can be misleading, as it has only limited or superficial economic analysis 
drawn from mostly anecdotal evidence. 
The Economic maladies of the Arab world are numerous and it would be difficult 
to list all of them. We can however, say broadly that the Arab world suffers from serious 
bad governance, isolationist policy, lack of adequate infrastructure to support growth and 
development, stagnant productivity and the misallocation of resources as a result of large 
state-owned and tariff protected industries.3 To this general list of problems we can 
produce an equally generalised response. The fact that government structures in the Arab 
world tend to be highly centralised and non-democratic need not be a negative attribute. 
The Arab governments could expedite reform through their centralised structures by 
reforming public savings through social security funds in order to increase savings and as 
such increase growth. They could also redirect resources towards human capital 
development in order to increase worker productivity and move away from stagnated and 
technologically deficient industries. This should be coupled with a general movement 
towards gradual liberalisation of trade and capital controls. This liberalisation would lead 
not only to greater competition and higher productivity but also would help technology 
transfers from the more technologically developed world. These are issues that Glain has 
merely paid lip service to in his book. He touches upon some of these subjects but does 
not adequately illuminate the manner in which reform could be undertaken. 
All in all, this book brings valuable insight into the machinations of the stagnant 
Middle Eastern economies from the ground level, thus illuminating the many hardships 
population in these countries suffer as a result of bad management and unfortunate 
international political circumstances. 
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